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_______________ 
 
No. 18-1567 
_______________ 
 
BANK OF HOPE, as successor to Wilshire Bank 
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MIYE CHON, also known as Karen Chon;  
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UB’s BAGEL & CAFE INC.; UBK BAGELS CORP.,  
doing business as Franklin Bagels & Cafe 
 
SUK JOON RYU, a/k/a James S. Ryu, Third Party Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
KWON HO JUNG; JAE WHAN YOO; STEVEN S. KOH;  
LISA PAI, Third Party Defendants 
 
Suk Joon Ryu, 
                    Appellant 
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_______________ 
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for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-01770) 
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares (Retired) 
_______________ 
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Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and MATEY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 17, 2019) 
_______________ 
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Michael M. Yi [ARGUED] 
Lee Anav Chung White Kim Ruger & Richter 
99 Madison Avenue 
8th Floor 
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3 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Courts have inherent power to keep their proceedings fair 
and orderly. They can use that power to order the parties before 
them not to talk with each other, the press, and the public. But 
that power comes with limits. The First Amendment requires 
that we tread carefully when we restrict speech. A court must 
thus explain why restricting speech advances a substantial gov-
ernment interest, consider less-restrictive alternatives, and en-
sure that any restriction does not sweep too broadly. 
Here, Bank of Hope sued Suk Joon Ryu for embezzling 
money from its customers. As the case went on, Ryu began 
sending letters to the Bank’s shareholders. Those letters al-
leged that the Bank’s claims were baseless and were ruining 
his reputation. He hoped that the letters would pressure the 
Bank to settle. The Bank then asked the magistrate judge to ban 
Ryu from contacting its shareholders. The magistrate judge 
agreed, and the District Court affirmed. But the District Court 
marshaled no evidence that this restriction on speech was 
needed to protect this trial’s fairness and integrity. And it con-
sidered no less-restrictive alternatives. So its order violates 
Ryu’s First Amendment rights, and we will vacate and remand. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Bank accused Ryu of embezzlement 
Ryu helped found Wilshire Bank and worked there for dec-
ades as a high-level executive. Things changed in 2013: Wil-
shire Bank went through a series of mergers and eventually be-
came Bank of Hope. That same year, Ryu left to work for an-
other bank. 
About a year later, the Bank found out that one of its em-
ployees, Miye Chon, had stolen money from dozens of custom-
ers. She had managed to embezzle more than a million dollars. 
The Bank fired her, and she later pleaded guilty. 
Chon tried to take Ryu down with her. She alleged that Ryu 
had taken part in the embezzlement and taken a sizable cut of 
the proceeds. The Bank believed her and jumped into action: It 
froze Ryu’s personal account at the Bank. It shared its suspi-
cions with Ryu’s new employer, which then fired him. And it 
sued both Chon and Ryu to recover the embezzled funds. 
Ryu denied any wrongdoing, and the government never 
charged him. He also filed counterclaims against the Bank for 
various torts and breach of contract. Thus began this litigation. 
B. The District Court restrained Ryu’s speech 
Litigation can take a long time. Ryu grew impatient, so he 
took matters into his own hands. He sent a letter to the Bank’s 
chief executive, denying any role in the embezzlement and dis-
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paraging the evidence against him. He claimed that the litiga-
tion was ruining his professional reputation and had pained 
members of his family. And he advised the Bank to settle. 
Ryu heard only radio silence, but that did not stop him. Al-
most a year later, he sent a longer letter to the same executive, 
similarly blaming the Bank for his and his family’s maladies 
and financial straits. The second letter came with a threat: if the 
Bank did not settle, he would start lobbying its shareholders. 
Once again, his letter changed nothing. So Ryu followed 
through and wrote to dozens of institutional shareholders. 
These letters accused the Bank of a years-long campaign to de-
fame him and hurt his family. And they warned that the lawsuit 
would sap shareholders’ confidence in the Bank and undercut 
its value. Ryu hoped that the letters would pressure the Bank 
to settle on favorable terms. 
These letters irked the Bank, so it sent Ryu a cease-and-
desist letter. And it told the District Court that “Ryu [was] at-
tempting wrongfully and unlawfully to coerce Bank of Hope 
into making a settlement payment.” App. 50. The magistrate 
judge then ordered Ryu not to contact the Bank’s shareholders 
“pending further briefing and decisions on these issues.” App. 
70. After more briefing, the magistrate judge finalized that ban 
in another order. 
Ryu then appealed to the District Court, but to no avail. The 
District Court deferred to the magistrate judge’s recommenda-
tion and affirmed. Ryu now appeals to us. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER IS A COLLATERAL  
ORDER 
We must first decide whether we have appellate jurisdic-
tion. Our review is generally limited to “final decisions of the 
district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But we make a narrow ex-
ception for collateral orders. To be collateral, an order must 
satisfy three criteria. It must “[1] conclusively determine the 
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely 
separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Will v. Hal-
lock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Because the District Court’s order meets all three criteria, 
we have appellate jurisdiction. 
First, the District Court conclusively determined Ryu’s 
ability to speak to the shareholders. It barred him from contact-
ing the Bank or its shareholders and said that he could speak 
with the Bank only through his counsel. And it affirmed the 
magistrate judge’s second order without change. Nothing in 
this order suggests that it was non-final, conditioned on future 
events, or subject to revision. Cf. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 
F.2d 174, 177–78 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding an order non-final 
because it was expressly conditional and could be revisited). 
Yet the Bank makes much ado about one line in the magis-
trate judge’s second order. The magistrate judge ordered Ryu 
“to cease such communications pending further order from the 
Court.” App. 227 (emphasis added). But that is not enough to 
escape the collateral-order doctrine.  
To start, we review the District Court’s order, not that of 
the magistrate judge. But even if we consider the latter, the 
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Bank’s argument still fails because it ignores context. The 
magistrate judge’s original order was entered “for the short 
period of time that it will take to develop the record and fully 
brief these issues.” App 70. That order was tentative, but Ryu 
did not appeal it. Nor could he. Instead, he appealed the District 
Court’s order affirming the magistrate judge’s second order, 
which was entered months later, after detailed briefing. That 
order conclusively “precluded” him from contacting the share-
holders. App. 224.  
And an order can be collateral even if the lower court re-
tains “discretionary power to reopen [its] ruling.” United States 
v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1993). A contrary rule 
would swallow up the collateral-order doctrine. Collateral or-
ders are by definition not final, so courts usually can revisit 
them. Leaving this door ajar does not remove an order from the 
doctrine’s scope. If it did, almost no order would be collateral. 
That cannot be. In short, the doctrine’s first requirement is met. 
Second, the District Court’s order resolved an important, 
non-merits issue. The order was important: It imposed a prior 
restraint on speech. And it weighed Ryu’s First Amendment 
rights against the Court’s inherent power to manage proceed-
ings. The order was also unrelated to the merits. The Bank had 
sued Ryu to recover the embezzled funds, not to keep him from 
writing to its shareholders. And Ryu’s counterclaims sound in 
tort and contract. So the second requirement is also met. 
Third, the District Court’s order will be effectively unre-
viewable after judgment. If Ryu prevails, he cannot appeal 
from a favorable judgment. And if he loses, we could strike 
down the restraint, but the damage will be done. Ryu wants to 
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write to the shareholders now to get a favorable settlement. A 
victory after judgment would be empty; the reviewing court 
could not turn back the clock and let Ryu send his letters in 
time. “[R]eview postponed will, in effect, be review denied.” 
Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 1988), abrogated 
on other grounds by Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79 (2000). So the third requirement is met too. The 
collateral-order doctrine applies, and we have appellate juris-
diction. 
III. EVEN IF RYU’S SPEECH WAS COMMERCIAL, THE 
COURT ERRED BY RESTRAINING HIS SPEECH 
The District Court forbade Ryu to speak with the Bank’s 
shareholders. Such prior restraints on speech are presumptively 
unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. See N.Y. Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam). A 
judgment “deeply etched in our law” underlies that rule: “a free 
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech 
after they break the law than to throttle them and all others be-
forehand.” Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 
(1975). 
But the Bank argues that the prior-restraint doctrine does 
not apply. It claims instead that our review should be less vig-
orous because Ryu’s letters are commercial speech. True 
enough, the “traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply 
to [commercial speech].” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980). But 
neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found that 
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speech like Ryu’s letters was commercial, so whether the com-
mercial-speech doctrine plays any role here is doubtful.† We 
need not decide this issue, however, because the District 
Court’s order fails any level of scrutiny. 
If the Bank were right, and Ryu’s speech were commercial, 
the prior-restraint doctrine likely would not apply. Even so, the 
District Court’s order could not stand, because it fails even the 
less-rigorous form of review that governs limits on commercial 
speech. 
We assess limits on commercial speech using a multi-part 
test. This one comes from Central Hudson and has four parts. 
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. First, speech that is misleading 
or concerns illegal activity is unprotected. Id. But if the speech 
                                              
† Commercial speech is “usually defined as speech that 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). The 
First Amendment protects this speech because “the free flow 
of commercial information” lets the public make informed eco-
nomic decisions. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976). Whether 
First Amendment scrutiny applies largely depends on three 
factors: “(1) is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the 
speech refer to a specific product or service; and (3) does the 
speaker have an economic motivation for the speech.” U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 
933 (3d Cir. 1990). The Bank hangs its hat on the third factor: 
Ryu had an economic motivation for sending the letters. Ryu 
concedes that he sent the letters in part to prompt a favorable 
settlement. But the Bank cites no case showing that this fact 
alone is enough to make his speech commercial. 
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is lawful and not misleading, the restriction must satisfy three 
more prongs to survive. Second, the government must have a 
substantial interest in regulating the speech. Id. Third, the re-
striction must directly advance that interest. Id. Fourth, the re-
striction must be no broader than necessary. Id.  
A. Ryu’s speech is neither related to illegal activity nor 
misleading  
The first prong does not really fit this case. Ryu has never 
threatened to commit any crime or tort, and the Bank does not 
claim otherwise. His speech thus does not relate to illegal ac-
tivity. This would be a different case if the letters amounted to 
blackmail. 
Nor has Ryu made factually false statements. The Bank dis-
putes their accuracy, but that boils down to the underlying mer-
its of whether the Bank in fact defamed him or breached its 
contract. And we normally ask about the misleading nature of 
speech in the context of advertisements and the like, which of-
ten make factual claims that are “easily verifiable.” Va. Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Here, by contrast, we cannot 
ourselves disentangle the truth of Ryu’s letters from the merits 
of the lawsuit about which he speaks. Nor did the District Court 
make any findings to this effect. So we cannot say that this 
speech is deceptive. 
B. The District Court had a substantial interest in reg-
ulating Ryu’s speech 
At the second prong, we look for a substantial governmen-
tal interest. The District Court pointed to several, but only one 
in particular is legitimate. The Court restrained Ryu’s speech 
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in part “to protect the integrity of this litigation.” App. 240. 
That part of its reasoning was on sound footing. Courts have a 
substantial interest in ensuring the fairness and integrity of the 
proceedings before them. Indeed, they must give the parties a 
fair trial in both civil and criminal cases; failing to do so vio-
lates due process. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
552–53 (1976); Bailey v. Sys. Innovation Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 
(3d Cir. 1988). 
“Courts of justice are [thus] vested, by their very creation, 
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their 
presence.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) 
(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 
(1821)). That inherent power is part of courts’ discretionary 
authority to manage their cases. Id. 
But the order did not rest solely on protecting the integrity 
of this case. Both the District Court and the magistrate judge 
expressed a broader concern. Lawyers usually cannot speak di-
rectly to opposing parties. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 
(Am. Bar Ass’n 2016). Yet Ryu, a party represented by coun-
sel, wrote to the Bank’s shareholders. The magistrate judge 
thought that “[i]t would eviscerate that fundamental principle 
to allow [Ryu] to do what his counsel cannot.” App. 222. And 
the District Court deferred to this conclusion. The magistrate 
judge cited only a single authority for this proposition: “the 
spirit of” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. App. 222–23. 
Yet that rule says nothing about ex parte contacts. It merely 
recites the purpose of the Federal Rules, calling in the most 
general terms for making litigation “just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
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More importantly, we find no authority for a court to police 
the Federal Rules, let alone their spirit, by restricting speech. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (the Federal Rules “shall not abridge 
. . . or modify any substantive right[s]”). The only substantial 
interest that was before the Court, as far as we can see, was in 
ensuring the fairness and integrity of a particular judicial pro-
ceeding. Interests that are untethered from that particular pro-
ceeding are not enough. 
In short, the District Court had the power to impose a 
restraint. And it had a substantial interest in doing so.  
C. The District Court marshaled no evidence that the 
restriction on Ryu’s speech would advance that interest 
We next move to Central Hudson’s third prong, which re-
quires the court to ensure that its restriction directly advances 
that interest. The District Court thought that its restriction did 
that. It worried that Ryu’s letters would disturb its proceedings 
by forcing the Bank to drop its case and accept an unfair set-
tlement. The magistrate judge fretted that Ryu was trying “to 
obtain a strategic advantage” by talking directly to the Bank’s 
shareholders, bypassing its counsel. App. 222. Preventing such 
communications, it thought, would put the parties back on 
equal footing. 
But “mere speculation or conjecture” is not enough to re-
strict commercial speech. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 
(1993). Instead, the Court needed to ensure “that the harms it 
recite[d] [were] real and that its restrictions [would] in fact al-
leviate them to a material degree.” Id. at 771. Here, the District 
Court and the magistrate judge found no facts suggesting that 
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Ryu’s letters would coerce the Bank into an unfavorable settle-
ment. The Bank’s executives never declared or testified to that. 
Nor was there any evidence that the Bank’s shareholders influ-
enced the Bank’s litigation strategies. We see no evidence that 
could justify this restriction on speech. 
D. The District Court failed to consider less-restrictive 
alternatives 
Another problem is with tailoring. If a court can “achieve 
its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that 
restricts less speech, [it] must do so.” Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002). But neither the magistrate 
judge nor the District Court considered a single alternative to 
this restraint on speech. 
And not for a want of options. The Court could have limited 
the time for which the restraint would apply. It could have 
barred Ryu from making only certain representations to share-
holders, instead of a blanket ban. It could have supervised set-
tlement discussions to guard against undue influence. If the 
case went to trial, it could have enlarged the jury pool and used 
cautionary jury instructions to remove any lingering doubts 
about fairness. In short, the District Court had many options. 
Before restricting Ryu’s speech, it had to consider at least some 
of them and find them inadequate. 
We do not question courts’ longstanding authority to regu-
late the parties before them and to issue orders to promote the 
fairness and integrity of that litigation. But “[b]ecause of their 
very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint 
and discretion.” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. Before restraining 
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speech, courts must review the record for evidence that a 
speech restriction will make that particular lawsuit fairer and 
consider other, less-intrusive alternatives. No matter what kind 
of scrutiny applies, courts must always “consider[ ]  the ‘fit’ be-
tween [their] ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
[them].” Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 486 
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the District 
Court made no such finding here, its order cannot survive even 
intermediate scrutiny. 
* * * * * 
The District Court’s concerns were understandable. We 
must vigilantly guard against efforts to undermine the judicial 
process. But the antidote usually lies in more speech and less 
government intrusion. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996). 
The First Amendment requires courts to tread warily when 
restricting litigants’ speech. They may do so only when neces-
sary to protect the fairness or integrity of the particular litiga-
tion before them. And they must first find that the speech risks 
harming that litigation, that restricting the speech will alleviate 
that particular harm, and that less-restrictive alternatives will 
not suffice. The District Court here made no such findings and 
considered no alternatives. So we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings. 
